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Whether the debate on the ability to attack enemy bases is a matter of propriety, possession is an issue, or start is an issue ~ possession is an issue.

2022-05-12  Category:Japan

Whether the debate on the ability to attack enemy bases is a matter of propriety, possession is an issue, or start is an issue ~ possession is an issue.

鳩山一郎 Photo by Unknown author (licensed under CC0 1.0)

As the public opinion seems to confuse the debate about the ability to attack an enemy base, whether it is okay to attack the enemy base, whether it is okay to possess its weapons, and at what stage the launch of the enemy's attack is.

Looking at the government's views so far, the ability to attack enemy bases is consistently within the scope of defense, and the view on the start is also clarified. The problem is which is a debate about whether to have to have it.

Regarding the ability to attack enemy bases, Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama's reply in 1956 stated that when receiving a missile attack, "it is absolutely unthinkable that the purpose of the Constitution is to sit down and wait for self-destruction." Since then, the content continues to be interpreted as being constitutionally permissible.

1956 Ichiro Hatoyama

The purpose of the Constitution is to sit down and wait for self-destruction when an imminent infringement is committed against Japan and an attack by guided bullets is made against Japan as a means of the infringement. I don't think I can think of it. In such cases, take the minimum necessary measures that are unavoidable to prevent such attacks, for example, as long as it is recognized that there is no other means to prevent attacks by guided bullets, etc. I think that hitting the base is legally included in the scope of self-defense and should be possible.

In 1999, Defense Agency Secretary Noroda replied that the Self-Defense Forces would use the necessary force if there was a risk of an armed attack.

1999 Hosei Norota

In situations where an armed attack against Japan does not occur, the police agency will take the primary action, but if the general police force cannot deal with it, the Self-Defense Forces will take action by security operations to suppress the situation. I can think of it.
Then, if a certain situation corresponds to an armed attack on Japan or a case where there is a risk of it, a defense operation will be ordered and the Self-Defense Forces will use the necessary force to defend Japan. That's why.

In 2003, the Secretary of Defense Shigeru Ishiba stated that he would make Tokyo a sea of ​​fire, and said that he would consider it as a start if he started injecting fuel.

2003 Shigeru Ishiba

Now, as for the question of the committee members, there is a statement that Tokyo will be made into a sea of ​​fire, that it will be returned to ashes, and for that reason, to achieve it, to realize it, to realize it. If you're just starting to inject fuel, or if you've done that, that's a clear intention.
If you say that you're going to shoot this and return Tokyo to ashes, and you've just started injecting fuel, or you've just started to prepare for that, it's just like you're standing up. Then, isn't it a start? That's right, because the intention is clear and that's what it is. So, what I say the Foreign Minister is answering is no different.



MEMO

On February 16, 2022, Minister of Defense Nobuo Kishi at the House of Representatives Budget Committee subcommittee over the "enemy base attack capability" that the government is considering possessing, and the SDF aircraft entered the other party's territory. He said he would not "exclude" the option of bombing military bases, and acknowledged that it was within the scope of self-defense.



As mentioned above, the government's view has already answered that the ability to attack enemy bases is within the scope of the right of self-defense.

There is a 1969 Cabinet decision on the "holding" in question.

1969 Cabinet decision

Possession of so-called offensive weapons, which are used exclusively for the catastrophic destruction of the land of the other country in terms of performance, will immediately exceed the minimum necessary range for self-defense, so it is permissible in any case. It will not be.
For example, it is not permissible to own an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), a long-range strategic bomber, or an offensive carrier.

This is the current debate about "possession" of enemy base attack capability. In other words, it is a debate about whether it is the minimum weapon of self-defense or beyond it.

Of course, the current government view is interpreted as being within the scope of the right of self-defense, so it does not fall under "used only for catastrophic destruction" and can be interpreted as being possessable. So far, the government's view has consistently been that possession of the ability to attack enemy bases is within the scope of the right of self-defense, but # blue# has been obscured without actually possessing it.

All that's happening right now is , which is just a move to actually own it.



POINT

Since the Cabinet decision defines weapons used only for the catastrophic destruction of the land of the other country, it is clear that this does not apply to weapons used within the scope of the right of self-defense.