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Whether the debate on the ability to attack enemy bases is a matter of propriety, possession is an issue, or start is an issue - possession is an issue.

2022-05-12  Category:Japan

鳩山一郎

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What is the issue regarding the ability to attack enemy bases

The debate over the ability to attack enemy bases has led to confusion in public opinion regarding whether it is permissible to attack enemy bases, whether it is permissible to possess such weapons, and what stage refers to the initiation of an enemy attack. appear. Looking at the government's views so far, it has consistently been stated that the ability to attack enemy bases falls within the scope of defense, and the government has also made clear its views on launching such attacks. The question is whether or not to actually own it.

    Issues regarding the ability to attack enemy bases
  1. [Possibility] Is it okay to attack enemy bases (enemy territory)?
  2. [Initiation] What is the initiation of an attack by an enemy country (activation conditions)?
  3. [Holding] When and what to hold

Regarding the ability to attack enemy bases, Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama already answered in 1956 that in the event of a missile attack, ``It is inconceivable that the purpose of the Constitution is to sit back and wait for self-destruction.'' Since then, the Japanese government has continued to interpret it as constitutionally permissible.

1956 Ichiro Hatoyama

The purpose of the Constitution is that if an imminent illegal violation is committed against our country, and if a guided missile or other attack is carried out on our land as a means of such violation, we should sit back and wait for our own destruction. I don't think I can think of it that way. In such cases, take the minimum necessary measures to prevent such attacks, for example, as long as it is recognized that there is no other way to defend against attacks by guided missiles, etc. I believe that hitting bases with guided missiles is legally within the scope of self-defense and should be possible.

In 1999, Defense Agency Director General Norota responded that the Self-Defense Forces would use the necessary force if there was a threat of an armed attack.

1999 Yoshinari Norota

In situations that do not result in an armed attack against our country, police agencies are primarily responsible for dealing with the situation, but in cases where the general police force cannot respond, the Self-Defense Forces respond by dispatching public order, and are not responsible for suppressing the situation. It's possible.
Then, if a certain situation corresponds to an armed attack against our country or the possibility of such attack, a defense operation is ordered, and the Self-Defense Forces will use the necessary force to defend our country. That's why .

In 2003, regarding the launch of an attack on Japan, Director-General of the Defense Agency Ishiba announced that he would turn Tokyo into a sea of fire, and stated that if Japan began injecting fuel, this would be considered the start.

2003 Shigeru Ishiba

Now, I have a question from the committee members: There has been a statement that Tokyo will be reduced to a sea of fire, that it will be reduced to ashes, and for that purpose, in order to accomplish that, in order to make it come true. If they started injecting fuel or did something like that, then their intentions would be clear.
This is a case where someone says, "I'm going to shoot this thing and reduce Tokyo to ashes," and then they just start pumping fuel, or they start making preparations, and they start taking action. Well, if you do that, wouldn't that be called a start?. That's true, because the intention is clear and that's what it is. Therefore, what I am saying is no different from what the Minister of Foreign Affairs is saying.



MEMO

On February 16, 2022, Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi spoke at a subcommittee of the House of Representatives Budget Committee regarding the "capability to attack enemy bases" that the government is considering possessing. , stated that they would not rule out the option of bombing military bases, and acknowledged that it falls within the scope of self-defense.



As stated above, the government has already stated that the ability to attack enemy bases is within the scope of the right of self-defense. Regarding the next issue, ``retention'', there was a Cabinet decision in 1969.

1969 Cabinet decision

Possessing so-called offensive weapons, whose performance is exclusively used for catastrophic destruction of the enemy country's homeland, immediately goes beyond the minimum necessary range for self-defense. Therefore, it is not allowed under any circumstances.
For example, the possession of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), long-range strategic bombers, and attack aircraft carriers is not allowed.

This is the current argument for ``possession'' of the ability to attack enemy bases. In other words, the debate is whether it is a minimal weapon for self-defense or whether it exceeds it.


Since the current government opinion has interpreted it as falling within the scope of the right of self-defense, it does not fall under "offensive weapons used only for catastrophic destruction" and can be interpreted as something that can be possessed. . Until now, the government's position has consistently been that possessing the ability to attack enemy bases is within the scope of the right of self-defense, but it has not actually possessed it and has kept it ambiguous. All that's happening now is an effort to actually own it. Possession of the ability to attack enemy bases has already been deemed constitutional, and the launch of an attack by the enemy has been defined, so it would be unreasonable to now say that we are opposed to actually having the ability to attack enemy bases. The premise of the argument seems to be different.



POINT

The cabinet decision defines weapons as those used only for the catastrophic destruction of the enemy's homeland, so it is clear that this does not apply to weapons used within the scope of the right of self-defense.